Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring by Setty, Ofer
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with
Monitoring
Ofer Setty
Tel Aviv University
30 December 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35640/
MPRA Paper No. 35640, posted 30 December 2011 17:34 UTC
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring
Ofer Setty
Tel Aviv University
December 30, 2011
Abstract
Monitoring the job-search activities of unemployed workers is a common gov-
ernment intervention. I model monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance
framework of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), where job-search e¤ort is private in-
formation for the unemployed worker. In the model, monitoring provides costly
imperfect information upon which the government conditions the unemployment
benets. In the optimal monitoring scheme, random monitoring, together with
endogenous sanctions and rewards, create e¤ective job-search incentives for the un-
employed worker. For CRRA utility, the monitoring frequency increases and the
spreads decrease with promised utility, if and only if the coe¢ cient of risk aver-
sion is greater than 12 . Compared to optimal unemployment insurance, monitoring
saves, at the balanced budget point, about eighty percent of the cost associated with
moral hazard. The gain is achieved by a decrease of more than half in the standard
deviation of consumption.
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1 Introduction
Most unemployment insurance programs in the United States include monitoring of the
job-search e¤ort of the worker (Grubb, 2000). A typical monitoring policy requires the
unemployed worker to record his job-search activities by listing the employers he contacted
in a given period. At the employment o¢ ce, a caseworker evaluates occasionally whether
the job-search requirements are met by verifying that the contacts are authentic. If the
caseworker nds the report unsatisfactory, then she may impose sanctions, usually in the
form of benetsreduction for a limited period.
In the last three decades active labor market policies such as job-search monitoring
have gained a higher share of the total spending on labor policies1. Such policies are
receiving increasing attention as governments seek to insure unemployed workers without
damaging their incentives for becoming employed.
Given that job-search monitoring is available and is implemented by governments, it is
important to model this policy, and to examine to what extent these instruments increase
the e¢ ciency of unemployment insurance programs. This is a non-trivial task since such
instruments, as valuable as they may be, are also costly.
In this paper I modelmonitoring in the framework of optimal unemployment insurance
developed by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and characterize the optimal contract in the
presence of monitoring. In optimal unemployment insurance, a risk neutral planner insures
a risk averse worker against unemployment by setting transfers during unemployment and
a wage tax or a subsidy during employment. During unemployment, the worker searches
for a job by exerting an e¤ort level which is his private information. The rst best, had
the information been observable to the planner, is to deliver constant consumption to the
worker regardless of the employment status. Since, however, the planner cannot observe
1Between 1985 and 2001 the share of active labor market policies in OECD countries increased from
35% to 52% (OECD 2005).
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the job-search e¤ort, constant benets would aw the workers incentives to search for
a job. Therefore, to solve the incentive-insurance trade-o¤, benets should continuously
decrease during unemployment and the wage tax upon re-employment should continuously
increase.
I incorporate monitoring into the optimal unemployment insurance framework as fol-
lows. The planner monitors the unemployed worker with some history-dependent prob-
ability. When a worker is monitored, the planner pays a cost and receives a signal that
is correlated with the job-search e¤ort of the worker. The planner uses that signal to
improve the e¢ ciency of the contract by conditioning future payments and the wage tax,
not only on the employment outcome, but also on the signal. These future values create
endogenous sanctions and rewards, that together with the random monitoring, create ef-
fective job-search incentives: the worker exerts a high job-search e¤ort in order to increase
the probability of a good signal, and consequently to increase the probability of higher
payments.
Using a two period model I characterize the optimal contract for a worker with loga-
rithmic utility from consumption. The monitoring frequency and the dispersion of future
utilities complement each other in creating the incentives for the worker to search actively
for a job. The specic combination of those two components depends on the generosity of
the welfare system. As the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner mon-
itors the unemployed worker more frequently but imposes lower sanctions. The driving
force of this result is that while the cost of monitoring is independent of the generosity of
the welfare system, the cost of spreading future utilities increases with generosity.
I then use an innite horizon model to quantify the optimal contract. In this extended
environment I show that the characteristics of the optimal contract can be generalized to
any CRRA preferences with a coe¢ cient of risk aversion  of at least 0.5. When  < 0:5
the exact opposite happens: as the generosity increases, monitoring frequency decreases
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and the spread between utilities increases. This happens because  = 0:5 is the cuto¤
point between spreading costs that increase with generosity ( > 0:5) and spreading costs
that decrease with generosity.
The innite time model is then used for estimating the value of the additional instru-
ment of monitoring by comparing the results of the model to the results of a model where
monitoring technology is unavailable. I calibrate the model to the US economy at the
level of utility that balances the government budget for the model with no monitoring.
Keeping utility xed I compare the gain from monitoring to the gain from shifting to the
rst best allocation. I nd that the gain from monitoring equals to roughly two thirds
of the gain from shifting to the rst best allocation. These savings stem from the ability
of the planner to smooth the workers consumption across states. Indeed, monitoring
decreases about half of the standard deviation of consumption.
Empirically, the e¤ect of job-search monitoring on labor market outcomes such as
unemployment duration is usually signicant and positive2. Johnson and Klepinger (1994)
used random assignment of unemployed workers to treatment groups that di¤ered in the
job-search requirements. They nd that waving the weekly requirement to record three
contacts increased the average unemployment spell by 3.3 weeks. Benus and Johnson
(1997) nd that increasing the number of required contacts from two to four decreased
the average unemployment spell by 5.9%, and that informing the unemployed workers
that the contacts will be veried decreased the average unemployment spell by 7.5%.
The evidence on the e¤ects of sanctions is limited yet encouraging. In two empirical
studies that were conducted in the Netherlands, Van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring
et al. (2005) nd that the unemployment exit rate doubles following a sanction. Lalive
et al (2005) use Swiss data on benet sanctions and nd that both warning about not
2Van den Berg et al. (2006) consider a model where the e¢ ciency of search is damaged because
unemployed workers substitute formal channels for informal channels. For adverse e¤ects of job search
assistance see Van den Berg (1994) and Fougere et al. (2009).
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complying with eligibility requirements and enforcement have a positive e¤ect on the
exit rate out of unemployment, and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the
duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned.
Monitoring has been previously examined by several authors. A common assumption
in this literature is that monitoring perfectly reveals the agents hidden information (or
action) to the principal. This simplifying assumption, which goes back to the seminal
paper by Becker (1968) on Crime and Punishment, has important implications. In a
standard environment, using the signal allows the planner to get arbitrarily close to the
rst best allocation by using a combination of very low monitoring frequency (that costs
very little) with an extremely severe punishment that will never be applied. This potential
threat ensures that the worker exerts the high e¤ort.
In practice, extracting the exact information on the workers job-search e¤ort may
not be possible. Furthermore, even if extracting the exact information was possible, it
might be very costly, and it may be more e¤ective for the planner to extract imperfect
information on the job-search e¤ort for a signicantly lower cost.
In contrast with existing literature, my model allows for an imperfect signal. This is a
key generalization that has three essential implications. First, the monitoring probability
becomes a decision variable. Second, limited sanctions and rewards arise endogenously
in the optimal contract. Third, sanctions are applied in equilibrium. These results are
realistic for many applications of monitoring, including that of unemployment insurance.
Specically, maximal sanctions are usually not practiced and monitoring is not applied
with certainty. The consistency between the models results and the actual policy is a
clear advantage for the welfare analysis.
One of the exceptions of modeling imperfect signal is Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund,
and van Ours (2007). They restrict the set of policies among which the optimal one is
chosen. First, the planner does not condition the benets on the workers history, and
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second, the planner can only punish the worker by applying a xed decrease in benets for
the remaining unemployment spell. Their model, however, has the advantage of general
equilibrium which my model lacks.
Pavoni and Violante (2007) consider monitoring as part of an optimal Welfare-to-Work
program. In their model the planner can perfectly observe the workers job-search e¤ort
by paying some cost. As a result, the planner monitors the job-search e¤ort of the worker
with certainty and therefore sanctions or rewards are never needed.
For a more complete review on models of job-search monitoring see Fredriksson and
Holmlund (2006).
Although the focus of the paper is unemployment insurance, monitoring is a general
mechanism. Hence, I review models of monitoring in other contexts.
Aiyagari and Alvarez (1995) consider the optimal contract including perfect signal
monitoring given hidden information. In their model the planner may deprive the agents
leisure and determine his consumption. They characterize the optimal monitoring fre-
quency over compact consumption sets to avoid making the monitoring technology so
powerful that the problem becomes uninteresting. The contract characteristics near the
bounds of consumption lead monitoring frequency to be non monotone.
Popov (2009) models verication of hidden information reported by a worker. He
keeps the problem nontrivial by assuming that the utility function is bounded from below
and that the continuation utility is bounded. With this assumption the contract delivers
bounded sanction and reward according to the verication result. He nds that monitoring
never occurs with certainty and that for a certain class of utility functions the principal
would use verication regardless of this cost.
Newman (2007) studies entrepreneurial risk and occupational self-selection. He uses a
static principal agent problem to study the optimal match between exogenous monitoring
technologies and workers who di¤er by their outside option. The available monitoring
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technologies di¤er by their e¢ ciency in a way that can also be interpreted as providing an
imperfect signal. Newman shows that when workers have logarithmic utility, the optimal
contract leads to positive assortative matching between workers with a higher level of
promised utility and tasks that produce more observable output.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the innite horizon
model. In Section 3, I use a two period model to derive the theoretical characterization of
the optimal contract. In Section 4, I calibrate the model to the US economy. In Section
5, I characterize the optimal monitoring policy, and estimate the value of monitoring. In
Section 6, I conclude and discuss further research.
2 The model
2.1 The economy
Preferences: Workers have a period utility u (c) a where c is consumption, a is disutility
from job-search e¤ort or work, and u is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave. Workers discount the future at the discount factor .
Employment and Unemployment: The worker is either employed or unemployed.
During employment, which is assumed to be an absorbing state, the worker exerts a
constant e¤ort level ew, and receives a xed periodic wage w3.
During unemployment, the worker searches for a job with an e¤ort level a 2 fel; ehg
that is either low or high and is private information of the worker. The job-nding
probability increases with the job-search e¤ort level j 2 fl; hg and is denoted by j. The
low job-search e¤ort is interpreted as not actively looking for a job, and therefore I set
el = 0 and l = 0: For brevity of notation, denote henceforth eh as e, and h as .
3The assumption that employment is an absorbing state is widely used in the literature (e.g. Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini 1997, Pavoni 2009, and Pavoni and Violante 2007). This assumption allows us to
analyze one unemployment spell at a time, and does not a¤ect the qualitative characteristics of the
optimal policy.
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Monitoring technology: The monitoring probability  2 [0; 1] is a decision variable
of the planner. When the worker is monitored, the planner receives a signal on the
workers job-search e¤ort that is either good or bad, denoted by fg; bg respectively. The
probability of a good signal given job-search e¤ort j 2 fl; hg is j. The signal is only
informative if h 6= l, and I assume, without loss of generality, that h > l: This means
that following a high job-search e¤ort, a monitored worker is more likely to receive the
good signal, then following the low job-search e¤ort. Note that this technology does not
restrict h to be higher than 0.5. Indeed, there might be some strict monitoring tests
generating a useful signal for which h might be very small:
Allowing h to be smaller than 1 indicate that the planner receives imperfect infor-
mation regarding the workers e¤ort. This false negative option is a realistic feature of
the unemployment insurance system, representing a verication that fails unjustiably.
Allowing l to be (h) to be greater than 0 is another source of imperfection, representing
a false positive result. This imperfection occurs, for example, due to an administrative
failure or due to over-generosity of the caseworker.
The cost of monitoring is quasi-concave in the monitoring frequency and equals to
 per period, with   1: This cost discourages the planner from setting the moni-
toring frequency to 1 under all circumstances. This cost structure covers both constant
and increasing returns to scale. Decreasing returns to scale seem unreasonable since the
monitoring application can be split between caseworkers4. Nevertheless, I study convex
costs in the quantitative analysis and show that qualitatively the characteristics of the
contract are identical to those of the quasi concave cost.
The assumption that only one monitoring technology is available to the planner can
be relaxed by allowing the planner to choose a monitoring technology m from the set
M = i; ih; il; i	Ni=1 ; which includes N monitoring technologies.
4Given that the administrative institutions for unemployed workers already exist, I assume that mon-
itoring has no additional xed cost.
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Information structure: Both the worker and the planner observe the employment
state, the monitoring signal and the on-the-job e¤ort level5. The job-search e¤ort level of
the worker is his private information. This leads to the moral hazard problem.
Timing: Figure 1 shows the timing of the model and the four possible outcomes at
the end of the period. At the beginning of each period, the planner delivers consumption
c to the worker. Then, the worker looks for a job with an e¤ort level ej and nds a job
with probability j: If the worker becomes employed then the planner does not apply
monitoring6. If, on the other hand, the worker remains unemployed then he is monitored
with probability :When monitoring takes place, the planner pays the cost ; and receives
the signal s 2 fg; bg.
Figure 1 Approximately Here
Given the realizations of the employment state, monitoring, and the signal, the four
possible outcomes at the end of the period are: employment (e), unmonitored unemploy-
ment (n), monitored unemployment with a good signal (g), and monitored unemployment
with a bad signal (b).
2.2 The planners problem
The optimal contract between the planner and the worker requires, in general, condition-
ing the benets and the wage tax on the entire history of the worker. Spear and Srivastava
(1987), Thomas and Worrall (1988), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), and Phelan
and Townsend (1991) found that all the relevant information for the recursive contract
is contained in a one-dimensional object. In the monitoring recursive contract, as in the
5This assumption is standard in the optimal unemployment insurance literature, and goes back to
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). Wang and Williamson (2002) consider the case where the workers e¤ort
level a¤ects the probability of transitions both from unemployment to employment and from employment
to unemployment.
6When a worker becomes employed, the e¤ort level is perfectly revealed to the planner and therefore
monitoring such a worker is never optimal.
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unemployment insurance contract, this one-dimensional state is the expected discounted
utility U promised to the worker at the beginning of each period. This value is updated
at the end of each period, according to the outcomes. Hence, the state is governed by all
the relevant information in the workers history. Although this state is not a primitive of
the model, using it makes the problem tractable. Once the model is solved, the state is
used to back out the allocation for each type of worker.
In what follows, I present the planner problems during employment and during unem-
ployment.
2.2.1 The planners problem during employment
LetW (U) be the value for the planner from an employed worker who has promised utility
U: The planners problem during employment is:
W (U) = max
c;Ue
 c+ w + W (Ue) (1)
s:t: :
U = u (c)  ew + Ue;
where U e is the future promised utility contingent on employment. If c > w then the
planner delivers the di¤erence to the worker as a wage subsidy and if c < w then the
planner extracts the di¤erence as a wage tax. The constraint in the problem, commonly
known as the promise keeping constraint, states that the expected utility for the worker
given current consumption, disutility from work, and discounted future promised utility,
has to deliver, in expected terms, the utility U that was promised to the worker at the
beginning of the period.
Given the absence of moral hazard during employment, the solution to the employment
problem is full insurance and constant benets, which implies a constant wage tax or
subsidy.
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2.2.2 The planners problem during unemployment
I assume that the government announces the optimal policy at time zero and commits
itself to it. This assumption eliminates policies in which the planner deviates from the an-
nounced policy (e.g. the government does not monitor ex-post) and workers update their
beliefs according to the observed government policy7. Given the commitment assump-
tion, the question of whether the planner should monitor or not, need only be examined
ex-ante: if the addition of monitoring improves the e¤ectiveness of the contract then the
government should use monitoring and follow the monitoring scheme.
For an unemployed worker, the planner chooses for each possible state six variables:
consumption c, monitoring probability , and four continuation values, one for each possi-
ble outcome: employment U e, unmonitored unemployment Un, monitored unemployment
with a good signal U g, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal U b. In addition
to these six decisions, the planner recommends a job-search e¤ort level8. When the plan-
ner recommends a high job-search e¤ort level, he needs to support this recommendation
by making it worthwhile for the worker to follow the recommendation. This is achieved
by the incentive compatibility constraint that guarantees that the expected utility for a
worker who exerts the high job-search e¤ort is at least as high as that of a worker who
exerts the low job-search e¤ort9. Let V (U) be the value for the planner, who recom-
7The commitment assumption is typical in the unemployment insurance literature, e.g. Pavoni (2007)
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). There, too, the planner never deviates from the declared scheme.
8If the planner recommends the low e¤ort level then there is no need to set incentives and the solution
is constant benets and a constant wage tax. This solution can be achieved because while  > 0, the
probability of nding a job associated with zero e¤ort is zero. Therefore the planner knows that a worker
who received a job o¤er must have searched for a job with a high e¤ort level. The planner can use
this observation to apply a punishment severe enough to discourage workers from not following the low
job-search e¤ort recommendation.
9For high enough values of promised utility, creating incentives by spreading future promised utilities
is too costly and the planner recommends low job-search e¤ort and implements full insurance (Pavoni
and Violante (2007) refer to this state as Social Assistance). In the current calibration social assistance
is optimal only for values of promised utility associated with extremely high consumption levels, around
10 times the wage. Thus, in the simulations the promised utility values of the workers at the balanced
budget point are much lower than these values. To fully characterize the optimal monitoring policy, I
describe the monitoring policy as if creating incentives for the worker to extract the high job-search e¤ort
is always desirable.
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mends the high job-search e¤ort, from an unemployed worker who has promised utility
U . The problem of that planner during unemployment is:
V (U) = max
c;Ue;Ug;Ub;Un;
 c+ 
n
W (Ue) + (1 )
n
(1  )V (Un) + 
h
hV (U
g) + (1  h)V (Ub)
i
  
oo
s:t: :
U = u (c)  e+ Ue +  (1  )
h
(1  )Un + 

hU
g + (1  h)Ub
i
(2)
U  u (c) + 
h
(1  )Un + 

lU
g + (1  l)Ub
i
;
where the objective function includes: the cost of consumption payments to the worker;
the discounted value of employment at future promised utility U e; the discounted value
of unmonitored unemployment; the discounted value of monitored unemployment; and
the monitoring cost. The constraints are the promise keeping constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint. Since the incentive compatibility constraint is clearly binding at
the optimum, I will use equality below for this constraint.
By applying fairly standard results in dynamic programming, one obtains that W (U)
and V (U) are continuous functions, which are decreasing, concave and continuously dif-
ferentiable in U 10.
3 The optimal contract
While the model presented above is suited for quantitative study, it is too cumbersome for
theoretical analysis. To this end I analyze in this section a two period model that caries
the same economic forces as the full blown model. The following adjustments take place
in the two period model: W (U) becomes w   ce; U i becomes u (ci) for i 2 fe; g; n; bg ;
and V (U i) becomes ci for i 2 fg; n; bg.
10Since the monitoring cost is concave in , V (U) can be improved by using lotteries over the monitoring
probability. This is a linear programming problem that can be solved numerically as shown by Phelan
and Townsend (1991). I abstract from such lotteries in this paper. In the quantitative analysis I use a
linear monitoring cost that eliminates the use of such lotteries.
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I impose u (c) to be logarithmic and discuss the generalization of the results to CRRA
preferences in section 5. Finally, I assume for simplicity that  = 1.
Dene qi and pi as the probabilities of state i; given that the worker exerts an e¤ort
of a = e and a = 0 respectively. The Lagrangian of the planners problem is:
V (U) = Maxc;ce;cg;cn;cb;;1;2f c+ w   iqici   (1  )
+1

U + e  u(c)  iqiu
 
ci

+ 2[ip
iu
 
ci
  iqiu  ci+ e]g; (3)
where 1 and 2 are the Lagrange multipliers of the promise keeping and incentive com-
patibility constraints, respectively. Note that both 1 and 2 are negative.
I start the characterization of the optimal contract with two results regarding the
relative values of consumption levels.
Lemma 1 In the optimal solution current consumption equals to an average of future
consumption levels, weighted by the probabilities given high e¤ort qi; i 2 fe; g; n; bg :
Proof. The rst order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to the future con-
sumption levels ci; i 2 fe; g; n; bg evaluated at the optimal values are:
ci =  1   2 (q
i   pi)
qi
(4)
Summing up these conditions yields that 1 =  iqici: Di¤erentiating V (U) with respect
to current consumption yields 1 =  c, implying that iqici = c =  1:
The second result refers to the order of the future consumption levels.
Lemma 2 In the optimal solution ce > cg > cn > cb.
Proof. This follows directly from the likelihood ratios li = q
i pi
qi
; with le > lg > ln > lb;
where: le = 1; lg = (1 )h l
(1 )h ; l
n =   
1  ; l
b = (1 )(1 h) (1 l)
(1 )(1 h) .
Lemma 2 suggests that the monitoring technology creates an endogenous prize cg cn >
0 when the good signal is realized, and an endogenous sanction cn  cb > 0 when the bad
signal is realized.
13
Combining the rst order conditions for cg; cn and cb implies that cn = hcg+(1 h)cb:
Thus, in the optimal contract the prize and the sanction balance each other. Also observe
that as the precision of the monitoring signal increases, the ratio of sanction to prize, 
1  ,
increases. Therefore, for high precision signals monitoring is applied with a modest prize
with a high probability and a severe sanction with a low probability.
By the likelihood ratios, as the monitoring signal becomes more precise (h increases,
l decreases, or both), cg and cb move further away from c relative to the other two levels
of consumption ce and cn: In the extreme case of a non-informative signal, when h = l,
cg and cb are equal to cn. In the other extreme case, when h = 1, the sanction explodes
relative to any other spread. Note that as long as h > l, h = 1 provides a perfect signal
regardless of the value of l. This is the case because upon a bad signal, the planner knows
with certainty that the worker deviated from the recommended level of e¤ort. This event,
regardless of its probability, can be leveraged as much as needed to provide the incentives
for the worker to exert the high level of e¤ort.
I now move to the e¤ect of the workers state on the monitoring frequency and the
spread of future consumption. For the next proposition it is useful to set the problem in
two steps. In the rst step we solve for V (U; ), which is identical to the problem above
except that the monitoring frequency is given exogenously. In the second step
we solve for V (U) = max V (U; ) : The proof is inspired by Newman (2007).
Proposition 1 The optimal monitoring frequency increases with U:
Proof. I rst show that V (U; ) is super modular in U; . For a twice di¤erentiable
function this is equivalent to showing that @
2V (U;)
@U@
 0:
Recall that 1 is the shadow price of the promised utility constraint, and therefore:
@V (U; )
@U
= 1
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From Lemma 1 we know 1 =
 iqici c
2
: Thus, strict supermodularity between U and
 exists if and only if
@2V (U; )
@U@
=
@
n
@V (U;)
@U
o
@
=
@1
@
=
@f iqici c
2
g
@
> 0
The last inequality holds because the signal is informative, and therefore is valuable
(Holmstrom, 1979) in the sense that it allows the planner to decrease the cost of providing
consumption to the worker11.
Supermodularity implies that increasing one variable increases the returns to increas-
ing the other variables (Athey, 2002). In the monitoring context, increasing the promised
utility improves the return to monitoring. Therefore, as long as the rst order condi-
tion with respect to the monitoring frequency holds, the monitoring frequency strictly
increases with promised utility:
This result is consistent with the result of positive assortative matching in a model
where high promised-utility workers are matched with tasks that produce more observable
output (Newman, 2007).
The monitoring frequency is one of the two instruments of the monitoring policy.
The second instrument of monitoring is the spread between future utilities (henceforth,
spreads), dened as u(ci)   u(cj) i 2 fe; g; n; bg, such that ci  cj . The next main
result, proposition 2, complements the rst proposition by showing that as promised
utility increases the spreads decrease. The next Lemma is an important building block
for this result :
Lemma 3 When either  or U , or both change, all the spreads move in the same direc-
tion.
11In proposition 2 I also show directly that when the monitoring frequency increases all the spreads
decrease. Since the planner is risk neutral and the worker is risk averse, the channel of reducing the cost
of providing consumption to the worker is through a decrease in the spread of consumption levels.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 The spread between future utilities decreases with promised utility.
Proof. Rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint as a linear combination of
spreads.
[u(ce)  u(cg)] +  (1  ) [u(cg)  u(cn)] + ( (1  h) + h   l)[u(cg)  u(cb)] = e: (5)
Taken together with Lemma 3, (5) implies that if  is constant then the spread is constant
as well. This is the case since the coe¢ cients of all spreads in (5) are all positive.
Using (5) the e¤ect of an increase in the monitoring probability on the left hand side
of the constraint can be written as:
[u(cn)  u(cb)  h
 
u(cg)  u(cb)] + (h   l)[u(cg)  u(cb)]
The right term is strictly positive because h > l and cg > cb: Therefore, the total e¤ect
of the increase in the monitoring frequency on the left hand side is strictly positive if the
rst term is non-negative. For log utility this is equivalent to showing that:
log(cn) > h log(c
g) + (1  h) log(cb)
As I show above, at the optimum cn = hcg + (1   h)cb: Therefore, the inequality
above holds as the logarithmic function is a concave transformation of f(c) = c:
Therefore, following an increase in , the spreads must drop to keep the constraint
tight, and by Lemma 3 all the spreads drop together. Since we know from Proposition
1 that an increase in U leads to an increase in the monitoring frequency, and since an
increase in the monitoring frequency leads to a decrease in the spreads, it follows that an
increase in U also leads to a decrease in the spreads12.
12Equation (5) also shows that U may only a¤ect the spreads by a change in . This rules out
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Taken together, the two propositions above suggest that as the promised utility of the
worker increases the planner shifts the composition of the two components of monitoring:
increasing the monitoring frequency and decreasing the spreads. I now discuss the driving
force behind this result.
The gain of either of the two components is satisfying the IC constraint. The cost
for the planner of increasing the spreads is an increase in the average cost of providing
consumption due to the workers risk aversion. The cost of increasing the frequency is the
marginal cost of monitoring.
The dynamics of the monitoring frequency and the spreads are rooted in the risk
aversion of the workers utility from consumption. Log utility implies that as the promised
utility increases, the cost of spreading out the future promised values (i.e. the cost of
providing utility in spread values above the cost of providing the certainty equivalent)
increases as well.
Since the monitoring cost is independent of the promised utility level, the cost of the
sanction relative to the cost of applying monitoring increases with promised utility and
the planner substitutes sanctions with more frequent monitoring.
I show in section 5 that: this characterization can be extended to CRRA utility with
 > 1
2
; for  = 1
2
the monitoring frequency and the spreads are invariant to U ; for  < 1
2
the monitoring frequency decreases and the spreads decrease with U:
4 Calibration
The next task is to quantify the optimal contract for the US economy. To this end I
calibrate the innite horizon model presented in section 2.
Table 1 lists the parameters of the model. The unit of time is set to one month, and
combined e¤ect such as a decrease in the spreads because of the increase in the monitoring probability
and an independent increase in the spread following a change in U:
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preferences are log utility in consumption. The monthly discount factor  is set to 0.9959
to match an annual interest rate of 5% (Cooley, 1995). Monthly earnings, w; are set
to $2,800, which is the median monthly earnings of all workers (DOL, 2006a). The job
nding probability ; is set to 0:17, based on the CPS derived data constructed by Shimer
(2005). The disutility of work e¤ort, ew, which equals the disutility of job-search e¤ort,
e, is equal to 0:67 (Pavoni, Setty and Violante, 2010):
The monitoring technology is characterized by four parameters: the probabilities of a
good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort, h and l, respectively, the monitoring
cost per unit of monitoring , and the curvature of the monitoring cost .
The calibration of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort levels (h; l) of
the current US system is quite challenging for two reasons. First, while in the model
all workers have the incentives to search for a job with a high e¤ort, it is unclear what
fraction of workers indeed have those incentives in the US. I therefore assume that in the
current system only a fraction  search for a job with a high e¤ort.
Second, h and l stem from the imperfection of the system, which is unobservable
to either the case worker or the economist. Fortunately, the US department of labor is
engaged in systematic and detailed analysis of the adequacy of payments in the current UI
system (Woodbury (2002), DOL (2006b) and Vroman andWoodbury (2001)). Specically,
these projects reveal the fraction of overpayment and underpayment (denial errors) paid to
workers specically for non-separation errors, thus excluding reasons such as ineligibility
due to insu¢ cient previous earnings and quits.
Additional useful piece of information is the fraction of monitored workers who were
sanctioned, which is equal to the monthly probability of sanctions , over the monthly
monitoring frequency.
I proceed by writing down explicit equations that connect h and l to the observed
data, taking into account that only a fraction  exerts the high e¤ort level. First, the
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fraction of overpayment, denoted by z1 is equal to those who did not exert the high e¤ort
and received payments relative to all those who received payments: (1 )l
(1 )l+h . Similarly,
the fraction of overpayment, denoted by z2, is equal to:
(1 h)
(1 )l+h : Finally, the fraction of
monitored workers who were sanctioned, denoted by z3 is equal to:   (1  h)+(1  )
(1  l) :
Those three equations can be rewritten as an explicit unique solution of fz1; z2; z3g as
follows:
h =
1  z1
z2 + 1  z1 (6)
l =
z1  (1  z3)
z3 + (1  z3) (z1   z2)
" = (1  z3) [z2 + 1  z1] :
Based on the sources above the values for fz1; z2; z3g are f1:4%; 1:9%; 16%g, respec-
tively13: The implied values for the monitoring technology are: h = 0:98, l = 0:08 and
 = 0:8414:
The calibration of the signal probabilities implies a rather precise monitoring tech-
nology. The high value of h is inuenced by actions taken after the sanctions such as
appeals, and redetermination (see Table ES-1 in DOL (1999) and DOL (2006b)). The low
level of l on the other hand can be a¤ected by measures taken by workers to manipulate
the system. If this is the case then the value of l above is a lower bound of the correct
value. The sensitivity analysis below, however, shows that the results are robust even to
large increases of that value.
Before moving to the calibration of the rest of the monitoring parameters it should be
13The basis for z1 and z2 is Table 1 in Woodbury (2002) that gives the percentage of overpayment
of 7.2% and underpayment of 3.4% in the ve states pilot. The fraction of overpayment due to non-
spearation errors is 19.8% (DOL (2006b)) and for wrongful denials it is 57% (Vroman and Woodbury
(2001)). z3 is equal to the monthly probability of sanctions () of 3:3% (Grubb 2000), over the monthly
monitoring frequency
 
ACT

of 0:20 (see Appendix B).
14The high measure of workers who exert the high e¤ort of 0.84 is consistent with the observation of
Pavoni and Violante (2007) that the current system in the US the exceeds in providing incentives.
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emphasized that the analysis in this paper is based on the actual monitoring technology
in the US. Another direction for the analysis is the optimal monitoring precision given a
monitoring cost that increases with precision as in Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van
Ours (2007). Such cost-e¤ectiveness analysis may lead to using a lower precision-lower
cost monitoring technology.
The monitoring cost  is based on data from The Minnesota Family Investment Pro-
gram (2000), where each caseworker was responsible for 100 clients, and among other
tasks, applied sanctions, assisted with housing, and documented client activities. Based
on monthly gross earnings of $3,000 per caseworker and the caseload described above,
the value of  is $30 per month per monitoring of an unemployed worker15. This value
is an approximation because on one hand the caseworkers were also engaged in activi-
ties other than monitoring, and on the other hand they may have not monitored every
month. Interestingly, although Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) use
a completely di¤erent data sources, their equivalent value of  = $27 is surprisingly close
to the calibration here.
The interpretation of the monitoring action as a verication of employment contacts
is consistent with a linear monitoring cost, and therefore I assume that  = 1.
Table 1 Approximately Here
5 Results
This section includes two parts. First, I discuss the characteristics of the optimal moni-
toring policy for the innite horizon model. Second, I estimate the value of monitoring
by comparing the current model to a model without monitoring technology. Appendix A
describes the solution method.
15The median of annual earnings for Community and Social Services Occupations in the US is $36,390
(Department of Labor, 2006).
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5.1 Optimal monitoring policy
The optimal contract is described recursively by six functions of the state variable U .
These are

c; U e; U g; U b; Un; 
	
: I start with the mapping of current promised utility to
next periods promised utility, conditional on outcomes. In the optimal contract, the four
future values, corresponding to the four possible outcomes, endogenously create implicit
rewards and sanctions.
Figure 2 shows the mapping of promised utility across periods in utility units by
outcome. The horizontal axis is the promised utility at the beginning of the period and the
vertical axis is the next periods promised utility by outcome. As in the two period model,
the four future promised utilities are ordered by the likelihood ratios: U e; U g; Un; U b: Upon
employment, an outcome that can only happen in the model if the worker exerts a high job-
search e¤ort, promised utility increases; upon monitoring with a good signal, the worker
receives a reward that is only slightly lower than that of employment; upon unmonitored
unemployment, the promised utility changes only slightly; nally, upon monitoring with a
bad signal the worker experiences a severe decrease in promised utility, implying that the
planner nds the bad signal informative and helpful in creating the necessary incentives16.
The values of Un; U g; and U b, are determined jointly by the following condition, based
on the three rst order conditions: V 0 (Un) = hV 0 (Ug) + (1  h)V 0
 
U b

. The calibration of
h implies that the sanction level is signicantly higher than the reward17. This result
is consistent with the absence of prizes in the actual monitoring scheme, as they are
relatively small.
Figure 2 Approximately Here
I now move to discuss the monitoring frequency and the utility spreads decisions.
16By the likelihood ratios the good signal state can be more or less informative than the no monitoring
state depending on the parameters. In contrast, the bad signal state is always more informative than the
no monitoring state.
17In the two period model the ratio h1 h ; is equal to the ratio of the sanction over prize. This ratio,
whose value in the calibration is 49, plays a similar role here.
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According to the theoretical analysis in section 3 we expect that as promised utility
increases, the monitoring frequency would increase and the spreads would decrease.
Figure 3 shows the monitoring frequency by promised utility18. The monitoring fre-
quency varies across its complete support: for low enough values, the cost of spreading
out future utilities is lower than the cost of monitoring and no monitoring takes place;
for high enough values of promised utility the opposite is the case and the monitoring
frequency is at its maximum value.
As for the spreads, observe that given the calibration of h; U b is by far lower than
the other three future utilities. To demonstrate the dynamics of the spreads, I therefore
concentrate on the level of U b relative to Un: The dynamics of the rest of the spreads are
identical.
Dene the relative consumption sanction as the fraction by which the next periods
current consumption decreases upon a bad signal relative to that of unmonitored unem-
ployment19. Figure 4 shows the relative consumption sanction by promised utility. Note
that the sanction is plotted only for levels of promised utility for which  > 0: Taken
together, gures 3 and 4 demonstrate additional features of the optimal contract that
were proved in section 3. First, the sanction and the spread complement each other and
as one increases the other decreases. Second, when the monitoring frequency is constant,
the sanction remains constant as well. This can be seen for when  = 1, but also for
low levels of promised utility when the resolution of , creates steps in the monitoring
frequency.
Figures 3 and 4 Approximately Here
18The high span of promised utility in this gure, ranging from equivalent consumption levels of $20
to $200,000 a month, is used to demonstrate the qualitative characteristics of the contract. As I discuss
below the span of promised utility that includes the complete support of  can be much smaller (Figure
7). The subsequent quantitative results are based on a ne grid over a much smaller span.
19The relative consumption sanction is di¤erent from the spread dened earlier, which refers to the
absolute decrease in the lifetime expected discounted utility.
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The result that as the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors
the unemployed more frequently but imposes more moderate sanctions is supported by
some empirical evidence. Boone, Fredriksson, Holmlund, and van Ours (2007) nd that
when comparing the monitoring policies of the US and Sweden, the number of sanctions
is inversely related to the severity of the penalty.
Running the model with di¤erent levels of risk aversion in the CRRA class reveals
an interesting pattern: the dynamics of the monitoring probability and the spreads ip
exactly when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion () falls below 1
2
: In other words 
increases in U (and the spreads decrease) for any  > 1
2
;  and the spreads are invariant
in U if  = 1
2
; and  decreases in U (and the spreads decrease) for  < 1
2
20:
I demonstrate the importance of  = 1
2
in a simple two period model with no moni-
toring and no current compensation. The problem becomes:
V (U) = max
ce;cn
fw   ce   (1 )cng
s:t: :
U =  e+ u (ce) + (1  )u (cn)
U  u (cn) :
The solution to this problem is cn = u 1 (U) ; ce = u 1
 
U + e


. The di¤erence between
the rst best (constant consumption across both future states) and the second best is
then equal to the cost of spreading the future values:
u 1

U +
e


+ (1 )u 1 (U)  u 1 (U + e) : (7)
Using CRRA utility and di¤erentiating this cost with respect to promised utility gives:
20Newman (2007) nds that  = 0:5 is the critical value for the distribution of wealth across entrepre-
neurs and workers.
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(1  ) 1 



U +
e

 
1 
+ (1 )U 1    (U + e) 1 

: (8)
Note that the rst two terms compose a lottery, whose expected prize value is U: The
value of the derivative is positive if and only if f (x) = x

1  is a strictly convex function.
The second derivative of (8) is:
 (2   1) (1  ) 1 



U +
e

 
1 
+ (1 )U 1    (U + e) 1 

;
which is positive if and only if  > 1
2
. Since the cost of spreading out utilities is increasing
in promised utility if and only if the derivative is positive, it follows that the cost is
increasing if and only if  > 1
2
:
An interesting implication of this result is that as the level of risk aversion increases,
the change in the monitoring probability will be faster, i.e. the sensitivity of  to promised
utility will be higher because the increase in the cost of spreading consumption increases
as well.
5.2 The value of monitoring
The planners value from the optimal monitoring policy lies between the value of optimal
unemployment insurance, which is a special case of monitoring with  = 0, and the value
of the rst best. Thus, to study the e¤ectiveness of monitoring relative to unemployment
insurance, I dene the following metric: V
MON V OUI
V FB V OUI , where V
MON ; V OUI and V FB are
the planner values for optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring, optimal unem-
ployment insurance, and the rst best, respectively21. The di¤erence V FB  V OUI can be
considered as the moral hazard cost if no monitoring was available. Therefore, the metric
is the percentage of the moral hazard cost saved by including monitoring.
21The model with no monitoring is closely related to the model used in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
The main di¤erence is that in Hopenhayn and Nicolini the job-search e¤ort level is continuous and not
discrete. I use a discrete level of e¤ort in both models for consistency.
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Figure 5 shows the value of monitoring over the support of promised utility. Monitoring
is relatively more e¤ective at high levels of promised utility because for log utility the cost
of spreads increases with promised utility. At low enough levels of promised utility, the
optimal monitoring policy coincides with the optimal unemployment insurance policy. At
the other extreme of promised utility, savings strictly increase even though  is constant.
This happens because the cost of spreads continue to increase.
Figure 5 Approximately Here
Since the e¤ectiveness of monitoring varies signicantly across the state, it is of interest
to measure the savings at the level of promised utility that balances the governments
budget. The balanced budget point is U0 such that V (U

0 ) = 0. This is the level of
promised utility for which the costs of benets, wage subsidies and monitoring are exactly
covered by the tax revenues22. At U0 for the model with no monitoring the addition of
monitoring saves 82% of the moral hazard cost.
At U0 the monitoring frequency is 6% and the relative consumption sanction, which
is approximately a permanent decrease in consumption, is 4.8%. The other three states
lead to deviations on a scale much smaller than that of the relative consumption sanction.
In absolute value the savings at the balanced budget point amounts to $87, out of
$106 possible. The potential savings of $106 is limited since the optimal unemployment
insurance contract a la Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) already gets quite close to the
rst best by conditioning on the complete history of the worker and allowing the tax to
depend on the history as well.
5.2.1 Who should be monitored?
As noted above, monitoring is especially e¤ective for workers for whom the cost of spread-
ing utilities is high. So far I discussed the combined e¤ect of promised utility and risk
22This point is unique because V (U) is strictly monotone in U , .
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aversion on this cost. There are, however, other parameters that a¤ect the cost of spread-
ing utilities.
As can be seen in (7), the cost of spreading utilities increases with e

: Both an increase
in disutility and a decrease in the job-nding probability (given high e¤ort) decrease the
left hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint without changing the right hand
side, making it harder to satisfy this constraint.
Thus, monitoring will be relatively more e¤ective, not only for more generous welfare
systems, but also for two types of workers. These are discouraged unemployed workers
who have a high disutility from work (or a high utility from leisure) and workers with a
low job-nding probability. This nding ts well the application of monitoring to those
types of workers.
Quantitatively, changes in disutility from work or in the job-nding probability can
have a substantial e¤ect on the contract. In the case of log utility, for example, changes in
e or in  a¤ect the cost of spreads exponentially. Note that unlike the e¤ect of promised
utility on the spreading costs that is sensitive to risk aversion, the e¤ects of e and  on
the cost of spreads are more general as they are independent of risk aversion.
What about the dynamics of monitoring over the unemployment spell? Conditional
on unemployment, promised utility decreases along the unemployment spell and there-
fore qualitatively monitoring should decrease and sanctions should increase (for  > 1
2
).
Quantitatively, however, for log utility the optimal monitoring scheme is fairly insensitive
to such changes in promised utility. The planner can therefore use a xed monitoring
frequency together with a xed sanction. This relatively simple monitoring scheme would
deliver almost the same gains as the optimal one.
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5.2.2 What makes monitoring an e¤ective policy?
The reduction in the planners cost due to monitoring is achieved by consumption smooth-
ing. To demonstrate this and to assess the smoothing intensity, I simulate the consumption
paths for the optimal unemployment insurance model and for the monitoring model. Fig-
ure 6 shows three examples of consumption paths according to the two policies. In each
example, the worker starts o¤ as unemployed with a promised utility level of U0 , stays
unemployed for 4 periods and then nds a job. In the top panel, there is no monitoring.
In the middle panel, monitoring is applied in periods 1, 2 and 3 and in all three cases the
signal is good. In the bottom panel, monitoring is applied once in period 1, and results
with a bad signal.
Figure 6 Approximately Here
Consumption in the unemployment insurance model, where the planner has only two
outcomes to condition on, decreases monotonically, and then increases signicantly when
the worker nds a job. These shifts in consumption are required for creating the necessary
incentives for the unemployed worker to look for a job with a high e¤ort.
In contrast, consumption in the monitoring model varies very little, except for the third
panel where the worker was sanctioned. Note, however, that sanctions are a rare event
as they only happen when both monitoring and a bad signal happen. At the balanced
budget point the unconditional probability of a sanction,   (1  h) ; is around 0:12%.
This is equivalent, on average, to sanctioning one of about 800 unemployed workers or
sanctioning an unemployed worker once every 70 years!
The simulation shows that due to the additional information regarding the job-search
e¤ort, monitoring allows the planner to smooth the unemployed workers consumption.
Simulating the model over 60 periods and 5,000 workers shows that the standard devia-
tion of consumption in the monitoring model is less than half the standard deviation of
consumption in the model without monitoring.
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5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The comparison between the models with and without monitoring relies on the e¤ec-
tiveness of monitoring, which in turn relies on the four parameters of the monitoring
technology: the probabilities of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort h; l,
respectively, the cost per unit of monitoring , and the concavity of the monitoring cost
. In order to examine the robustness of the savings to these parameters I analyze the
response of savings at the balanced budget point to various values of these parameters.
The probability of a good signal given the high job-search e¤ort h determines the pre-
cision of the information extracted by applying monitoring. As h increases, the planner
receives more accurate information on the workers job-search e¤ort level and is therefore
encouraged to monitor more frequently. Furthermore, as h increases, the probability of
a sanction decreases and the planner can use more severe sanctions. In the extreme case
when h = 1 it is possible to get arbitrarily close to the rst best allocation by using a
combination of a very low monitoring frequency (that costs very little) with an extremely
severe punishment that will never be applied.
Table 2 presents the savings at the balanced budget point for various levels of h.
Holding l and  xed, as h increases beyond the benchmark value, the e¢ ciency of
monitoring increases as expected. As h decreases, the savings level decreases sharply
and at a value of h = 0:90 (close to the unlikely lower bound) the savings is 61%23.
Table 2 Approximately Here
Table 3 Approximately Here
The sensitivity analysis of l in Table 3 shows that monitorings e¢ ciency depends on
the di¤erence between the precision of the two signals (h; l). As l gets closer to h the
23Note that according to the monitoring frequency and the proportion of sanctions in the US the lower
bound for h is 0:84. For h = 0:84, the monitoring technology is useless and the savings would be 0;
as l = 0:84 as well. This description of the monitoring technology is inconsistent with the calibration
equations shown above.
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savings decrease signicantly.
Table 4 shows the savings for various values of the monitoring cost . First, note that
when  = 0; the rst best is not achieved because the free monitoring provides imperfect
information24. Second, as the cost of monitoring increases the planner uses monitoring
less frequently and the level of savings decreases. Nevertheless, even when  = 100, a
monitoring cost that is higher by more than three times than the benchmark calibration,
monitoring savings stands at about 70%.
Table 4 Approximately Here
Table 5 shows the savings for various values of the cost curvature . Since  is kept
xed, increasing the curvature parameter  implies lower costs and increasing savings.
More interesting is the dynamics of the monitoring frequency and the spreads over U
given convex costs. While V is concave in  for any quasi-concave cost, it is also concave
for some convex costs (see proof of Claim 1 in Appendix C). Since supermodularity in
proposition 1 holds for any cost curvature, the dynamics of the monitoring probability
and the spreads are expected to hold for convex costs as well.
With the caveat that V may not be concave in , gure 7 shows the monitoring
frequency for  2 f0:5; 1; 5g. Figure 8 complements gure 7 by showing the relative
consumption sanction for the same three cases. The two extreme cases show that while
qualitatively the characteristics of the contract are the same, the sensitivity to changes in
promised utility depends on the cost curvature. This demonstrates the wide spectrum of
results that the model can generate. Whereas for some parameters choosing  f0; 1g may
be a decent rule of thumb, for other parameters a xed monitoring frequency and a xed
sanction may be close to optimal.
24When  = 0, the planner monitors with probability 1.0 but since the signal is imperfect, the planner
cannot know for sure what the job-search e¤ort level was. Therefore, the planner still needs to condition
the promised utility on outcomes that will happen in equilibrium, which is costly.
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Note that the monitoring frequency for any two levels of curvature 12 cross when
the marginal cost of monitoring is equalized at  = exp

log(1=2)
2 1

:
Table 5 Approximately Here
6 Concluding remarks
Governments monitor the job-search activities of unemployed workers in order to increase
the e¤ectiveness of unemployment insurance. They randomly monitor job-search e¤ort
and receive, at a cost, a signal that is related to the e¤ort level. This additional information
plays an important role in the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
This paper uses the recursive contracts framework to model monitoring that may result
in an imperfect signal. This framework allows characterizing the optimal contract given
this realistic technology, and evaluating the gain from using the monitoring technology.
I show how the two components of monitoring, the monitoring frequency and the
spread of continuation values complement each other depending on the state of the worker.
For CRRA utility, the monitoring frequency increases and the spreads decrease with
promised utility if and only if  > 1
2
. The driving force behind the result is that the cost
of spreading out future utilities increases with the continuation value if and only if  > 1
2
,
while the cost of monitoring is invariant to the continuation value.
In the quantitative analysis at the balanced budget point I show that compared to
optimal unemployment insurance, monitoring saves about 80% of the cost associated
with moral hazard. The gain is achieved by a decrease of more than half in the standard
deviation of consumption.
One limitation of the framework used in this paper is that the tractability of the paper
depends on the assumption that the planner controls the consumption of the worker, i.e.
no savings on the workers side allowed. As pointed out by Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and
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Sahin (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008), allowing the workers to hold unobservable
savings may signicantly a¤ect the results. Nevertheless, the recursive contract framework
demonstrates the main trade-o¤s when a costly imperfect signal in available. It seems that
as long as di¤erentiating future levels of payments is necessary not only that monitoring
can be e¤ective, but also the trade-o¤s presented in this framework should hold. Also
note, that as the environment presented here can be applied to other contexts such as
crime and punishment, the no-savings assumption might be perfectly reasonable.
Another limitation of that framework is that all sanctions in equilibrium are unjusti-
ed. This happens because the incentive compatibility constraint holds. These sanctions
are necessary in the contract to keep the workers incentives in place. The same concept
of unjustied punishments holds in optimal unemployment insurance as well. There, con-
ditional on unemployment, the worker experiences benet cuts even though the planner
is aware that the e¤ort recommendation is followed. A more realistic model would in-
clude unobserved heterogeneity in disutility from job-search and from work. Then, the
sanctions in equilibrium would be partially justied.
Alternatively, heterogeneity can be introduced through wages. This would allow con-
ditioning the initial level of promised utility on the wage of each type of worker as applied
in most OECD countries25.
According to Grubb (2000), there are signicant di¤erences across countries in all the
main characteristics of the policy. As an example, consider Australia and the US. In
Australia a moderate sanction of 18% of the benets level is applied for a duration of
26 weeks, equivalent to roughly 4.5 weeks of benets. This is considerably higher than
the one week denial of benets in the US. At the same time the annual sanction rate in
Australia is relatively low, standing at 1.2%, compared with 33% in the US. An extended
25This heterogeneity in wages would reduce and possibly eliminate the result that for high levels of
promised utilities the planner recommends a low job-search e¤ort: once high levels of promised utilities
will be associated with high wages, the gain from employment to the planner will dominate the cost of
setting the incentives for the high job-search e¤ort.
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model could reveal whether the variation in policies follows labor market characteristics
or some ine¢ ciencies.
Although the focus of the paper is monitoring of unemployed workers, the modeling
environment presented in this paper is rather general. The model can be used for a wide
array of problems, where a planner uses a costly imperfect signal to learn about the agents
hidden information or action
The analysis of monitoring can also be applied to systems in which the probability
of a good signal given the high e¤ort is very low. In this case the prize relative to the
sanction will be very high and a reasonable implementation of the contract could include
a prize only. This characterization is consistent with competitions.
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APPENDIX A: COMPUTATIONAL METHOD
This appendix describes the solution method for the problem of a planner who recom-
mends the high job-search e¤ort during unemployment26.
Transform the maximization problem with six decision variables and two constraints
into a maximization problem with four decision variables and no constraints.
Write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows27:
u (c)  e+ Ue +  (1  ) (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b
= u (c) + 

(1  )Un +   lUg + (1  l)U b
and express U e in terms of Un; U g; U b and  :
Ue=
e

+(1  )Un 


[(1  ) h   l]Ug + [(1  ) (1  h)  (1  l)]U b
	
(9)
Use the promise keeping constraint to express c in terms of U e; Un; U g; U b and  :
c = u 1

U + e   Ue + (1  )  (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b	 (10)
Use (9) in the right hand side of (10) to express the consumption level (c) in terms of
Un; U g; U b and : Substitute this value of c and the value for U e from (9) into (2) to
receive the maximization problem with four decision variables: Un; U g; U b and ; with no
constraints.
Those four remaining decision variables consist of three continuation values (Un; U g; U b)
and the monitoring frequency . While the support for the continuation values is, in gen-
eral, the real line, the support for the monitoring frequency is [0; 1]. This closed support
presents a computational challenge, which I overcome by distcritizing the support of the
26In absence of asymmetric information, the solution to the employment problem consists of constant
benets for the complete duration of employment.
27In the optimal solution, the incentive compatibility constraint always holds with equality. This is the
case simply because delivering an expected discounted utility that is higher than the required one, costs
more.
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monitoring frequency into 151 values and then solve the maximization problem for each
of those 151 values28.
Thus, the maximization problem is reduced to three continuous variables: Un; U g; U b:
The solution to this problem is based on the three rst order conditions with respect to
Un,U g, and U b respectively: 
u 1
0
(c_ arg) + W 0 (Ue) + (1  )V 0(Un) = 0 
u 1
0
(c_ arg) (1  l) W 0 (Ue) ((1  ) h   l) + (1  )hV 0(Ug) = 0 
u 1
0
(c_ arg) l  W 0 (Ue) ((1  ) (1  h)  (1  l)) + (1  ) (1  h)V 0(U b) = 0
where I have dened for brevity of notation:
c_ arg = U + e   Ue + (1  )  (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b
28The sensitivity of the solution is, therefore, 0:0033 of monitoring frequency.
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APPENDIX B: THE MONITORING PROBABILITY IN THE US
The calibration of the actual monthly monitoring probability in the US, ACT , is based
on the frequency of required reports of employment contacts that the unemployed workers
ll in and on the probability that these contacts are veried. While the weekly frequency
of reports is fairly consistent across states (OLeary 2004), the probability or verifying
these contacts varies vastly across states: some states (e.g. Pennsylvania) do not monitor
at all; some states (e.g. Washington) have a target monitoring frequency of 10%; and some
states (e.g. South Dakota) consistently review contacts every 4-6 weeks (DOL 2003).
In addition to the vast variance in the probability of verifying contacts across states,
the information is also usually vague, possibly because it is of the interest of states to
conceal the actual probability of verifying contacts. As a benchmark for the probability
of verifying employment contacts in the US I use a conservative value of 5% (the lower
this probability the lower is h), which determines, together with a weekly frequency of
reports, a monthly monitoring probability
 
ACT

of 20%29.
29The unemployed worker submits 52=12 = 4 13 reports a year. The probability of being monitored at
least once in a month is: 1   0:954:33 = 0:20, where 0.95 is the probability of not being monitored in a
given week.
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APPENDIX C: PROOFS
Lemma 3 When either  or U , or both change, all the spreads move in the same direc-
tion.
Proof. Recall that the spread between any two future utilities is dened as u(ci) u(cj)
i 2 fe; g; n; bg, such that ci  cj: The ordering of consumption levels is used only for
convenience, as it guarantees that the spreads are non-negative.
Let

ci1; c
j
1; c
k
1; c
l
1
	
;

ci2; c
j
2; c
k
2; c
l
2
	
be the optimal consumption levels for fU1; 1g ; fU2; 2g,
respectively, and assume without loss of generality that c
i
1
cj1
 ci2
cj2
; i.e., that the spread is
larger when fU; g = fU1; 1g : Using the rst order conditions cicj = 1+2l
i
1+2lj
. Therefore:
11+
1
2l
i
11+
1
2l
j  
2
1+
2
2l
i
21+
2
2l
j . After multiplying by both denominators (note that
  cj1   cjj =
cj1c
j
j > 0) and rearranging we get that: 
1
2
2
1   1122  0: By repeating the same steps
backwards for any j; k, we get that: c
k
1
cl1
 ck2
cl2
; with strict inequality if c
i
1
cj1
>
ci2
cj2
:
Since u(ci) u(cj) = log( ci
cj
), if one spread decreases, then the rest of the spreads must
decrease as well.
Claim 1 @
2V (U)
@2
< 0
Proof. Use the promise keeping and incentive compatibility constraints to derive c;
and U e as a function of U g; Un; U b and :
Ue =
e

+ (1  )Un + 

 
lU
g + (1  l)U b
  (1  )  hUg + (1  h)U b	
c = u 1

U    (1  )Un +   lUg + (1  l)U b
Substitute the constraints into the maximization problem:
V (U) = max
Ug;Ub;Un;
  u 1 U    (1  )Un +   lUg + (1  l)U b
+
8<: W (
e
 + (1  )Un + 
 
lU
g + (1  l)U b
  (1  )  hUg + (1  h)U b	)
+(1 )(1  )V (Un) +  hV (Ug) + (1  h)V (U b)	
9=;
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Di¤erentiate twice with respect to  :
@2V (U)
@2
=   c      Un +  lUg + (1  l)U b2 +
W 00 fUeg 

 Un + 1

 
lU
g + (1  l)U b
  (1  )  hUg + (1  h)U b	2  
(a  1) 2;
which is strictly negative for every   1 since u 1 is convex and W is concave. Note
that since the rst two terms are strictly negative for any , the claim also holds for some
convex cost of monitoring.
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TABLE 1
Calibration parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Good signal probability given high e¤ort h 0.98 See text
Good signal probability given bad e¤ort l 0.08 See text
Monitoring cost  $30 See text
Monitoring cost curvature  1.0 See text
The actual monitoring frequency in the US ACT 0.20 See Appendix B
Discount factor  0.9959 Cooley (1995)
Wage w $2,800 National compensation survey (2006)
Unemployment exit rate  0.17 Shimer (2007)
Disutility from e¤ort e 0.67 Pavoni and Violante (2007)
TABLE 2
Sensitivity analysis for the value of h
h 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.99 1.00
 0.61 0.72 0.82 0.87 1.00
TABLE 3
Sensitivity analysis for the value of l
l 0.0 0.08 0.30 0.50 0.80
Savings 0.84 0.82 0.77 0.70 0.35
TABLE 4
Sensitivity analysis for the value of 
 ($) 0 10 30 50 100
Savings 0.99 0.89 0.82 0.77 0.70
TABLE 5
Sensitivity analysis for the value of 
 0.2 0.5 1.0 2 5
Savings 0.37 0.6 0.82 0.93 0.96
*Fraction of the moral hazard cost
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jp-1
Employment
Consumption
Job Search
Unemployment
jp
mm-1
MonitoringNo Monitoring
jq-1jq
Bad signalGood signal
Fig. 1. The timing of the model and the four possible end-of-period outcomes: employment,
unmonitored unemployment, monitored unemployment with a good signal, and monitored un-
employment with a bad signal.
Fig. 2. The mapping of promised utility from the current period to the next period, con-
ditioned on the four possible outcomes: employment, unmonitored unemployment, monitored
unemployment with a good signal, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal. The values
for employment and monitoring with a good signal are above the diagonal (the diagonal itself is
not illustrated) and include a reward. The value for unmonitored unemployment is only slightly
below the diagonal. Finally, the value for monitored unemployment with a bad signal is low due
to the sanction.
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Fig. 3. The monitoring frequency by promised utility. As the generosity of the welfare system
increases, the monitoring frequency increases and the relative consumption sanction (Fig. 3)
decreases.
Fig. 4. The relative consumption sanction by promised utility.The sanction responds to changes
in the monitoring frequency (Figure 3).
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Fig. 5. The value of monitoring as the fraction of teh moral hazard cost of optimal unemploy-
ment insurance that is saved when the monitoring technology is available.
Fig. 6. Simulated consumption paths according to optimal monitoring and optimal unemploy-
ment insurance policies. The consumption paths for the unemployment insurance policy are
identical. The consumption paths for the monitoring policy depends on whether monitoring was
applied and the signals result.
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Fig. 7. Monitoring frequency for various monitoring cost types. As the cost becomes more con-
vex (alpha increases) the marginal cost of monitoring increases and the increase in monitoring
becomes more moderate.
Fig. 8. The relative consumption sanction for various monitoring cost types. The spreads
change according to the monitoring frequency (Figure 7).
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